Introduction
For much of the twentieth Century, the interrelationship between class and social democracy was fundamental. Electorally, parties were originally rooted in the working class, which provided the bedrock of their political support, and the core of their identity. Programmatically, in the postwar era, Keynesian political economy provided the theoretical justification for redistribution towards workers as a core element of social democracy. The relationship was never that straightforward even in social democracy's 'golden age'. By the end of the 20 th Century, it has become a good deal more problematic. This article explores the enduring relevance (or otherwise) of class, and in particular of the working class, to social democracy through comparative analysis of the British Labour Party and the French Socialist Party (PS -Parti Socialiste) at the beginning of the 21 st Century.
In the wake of a widely touted decline in class voting, and socio-economic change undermining the traditional working class electoral base of social democracy, with the strength of class and partisan identification weakening, class identities fragmenting, and class structure becoming more complex and variegated, many amongst party elites became convinced of the need to pursue increasingly 'catch-all' strategies less rooted in the working class, or indeed in the concept of class. The strategy, whilst it has certain benefits, also has costs, in terms of undermining the identification and loyalty amongst electors tied to a class identity which parties may now downplay. Furthermore, the 'top down' denial of class is not reflected in a 'bottom up' disappearance of all class cleavages. The reduced subjective emphasis on class characteristic of social democracy (New Labour much more than the PS) continues to confront objective obstacles. For example, both parties are confronted with a class-based electoral cleavage over European integration.
More fundamentally, a 'classless' social democracy has trouble carving out a coherent political economy. The neoliberal backlash in the last quarter of the 20 th Century undermined faith in the Keynesian paradigm which formed the bedrock of social democracy's redistributive class-based politics in the second half of the 20 th Century. The scope for redistribution appears subject to ever tighter 'external' constraints. At the same time, the Marxist paradigm, which had hitherto (albeit indirectly) underpinned the importance social democrats attached to class in understanding economic and social relations, was called into question, not least by the 1989 revolutions. In this context, the questioning of the centrality of class to social democracy can be seen as part of a wider search for a guiding set of principles around which to organise social democracy's redistributive instincts.
The problematic relationship between class and post-golden age social democracy is attested to throughout this article. There are two sections to this comparative analysis, the first exploring the place of class within each party's identity, and in turn its political economy. The focus of the article is on the elite-level conception of class, and elite-level perceptions of the relevance of class to party identity and political economy. The second section explores the importance of class to electoral strategy. Here again, the focus is primarily upon the elite-level perceptions of the relevance of class to social democratic electoral strategy. Thus emphasis is placed upon 'topdown' party elite strategy rather than 'bottom-up' socio-economic changes in the class structure.
We unearth significant differences in the importance attached to class by each party, and the role that class plays within the party's identity and analysis of the economy. New Labour has expunged class from its frame of reference. The resultant embrace of neoliberal economics has undermined the party's traditional identity. The party has become less recognisably social democratic as it seeks ever more accommodation with market outcomes. Conversely, the PS now seems firmly camped on social democratic territory it until recently shunned, retaining both an emphasis on class (and divergent class interests), and also the need for political direction or mediation of market outcomes to attenuate the antagonistic outcomes of the free play of market forces.
Although the declining centrality of class as a structuring feature of electoral strategy is to an extent common to both parties, New Labour has gone much farther down this route than the PS.
The class dimension pervades the genetic origins of Blair's party, yet he is deliberately eschews it, denying the existence of fundamental divisions in society. For all this, he paradoxically owes his success a cross-class electoral alliance which eluded Labour for much of the 20 th Century.
Conversely, Jospin's party is historically less 'organically' tied to class, but explicitly recognises the difference between classes -and of need to form a coalition between them. That said, his cross-class electoral alliance appears more fragile, given the context of party competition in
France, and the number of suitors of the working class electorate. We begin, however, by setting out how the concept of class will be approached here.
The Concept of Class
In this article our primary concern is to explore the way the term is used by the elites within the two parties concerned, but it would be wise to set out how class is understood in this article. This subject has provoked a heated psephological debate, and no single accepted definition of class exists. Evans, however, has rightly observed that the manual/non-manual dichotomy is a crude over simplification of the nature of the contemporary class structure, which 'impoverishes … measurement of class position, and, by extension, obscures variations in the composition on manual and non-manual classes.' with their Employer, such employees tend to possess some expertise and enjoy a degree of autonomy in the workplace, and those in a (short-term) 'labour contract relationship', who tend to be supervised and whose labour contract is closely regulation.
Differentiated along these lines, Goldthorpe's schema identifies the following class categories, the petty bourgeoisie (small employers and self-employed), the service class -or salariat (professional and managerial groups, subdivided into 'higher' and 'lower'), the routine nonmanual class (typically lower grade clerical 'white-collar workers'), and the working class (subdivided into semi-and unskilled manual workers, skilled manual workers, and foremen and technicians French data, but retain the manual/nonmanual dichotomy. Although unfortunate, this is not particularly problematic, since the task here is not primarily to establish the precise contours of the class structure and its impact upon voting behaviour, but to understand and critique how social democratic elites perceive the relationship between class and social democracy. The usage (or non-usage) of the term by political elites in speeches and documents, although it lacks the kind of precision set out above, is illuminating as to how social democracy is evolving at the beginning of the 21 st Century.
Substituting Class? : From Labourism to New Labour
Drucker's classic study sets out the conventional understanding of the importance of class to the Labour Party through exploration of the party's 'ethos.' Ethos 'incorporates a set of values which spring from the experience of the British working class,' its four core features are loyalty, sacrifice, attitude to money and a belief in explicit rules. Central to Drucker's ethos is the idea that, 'it arises out of a shared past, from a series of folk-memories or shared expression of exploitation, common struggle and gradually increasing power.' Deeply rooted in the past, ethos reinforces the influence of the party's 'own past and of the past of the Labour movement which produced and sustains it' on contemporary developments. 5 One should not see ethos as a purely constraining influence on party actors, 'it is possible to create or re-create a past which has never existed or which has ceased to exist…since such pasts are impervious to history, few are without some mythical elements.' Thus leaders may invent and evoke pasts at will to gain support for their programme so long as they proceed with subtlety and a firm grasp of the contours of The Blairite vision is shorn of any reference to the place of the unions, or indeed of any recognition of the working class as a distinct entity with a particular set of interests. Whilst this outright denial of class does represent a shift, the Labour Party has never been a 'pure' working class party. One ideological tradition within the party has long sought to transcend class divisions, entertaining aspirations for the attainment of a classless society. 13 The party has always embraced members, activists and leaders from diverse class backgrounds, and has been keenly aware of the need to extend its electoral reach beyond the confines of the working class. has no place. Nor does the instinct to redistribute to the 'working class', however conceived.
This has undermined Labour's traditional political economy. The party has become much less recognisably social democratic as it seeks ever more accommodation with market outcomes.
An initial attempt to frame this multi-faceted desire to transcend of class divisions talked in terms of 'stakeholders' -a bid to escape, 'the outdated view of the relationship between employer and employee as one of master and servant, or the institutional conflict between unions and management.' However, for all this rhetorical attachment to a cross-class analysis of society, the PS elite has The enduring relevance of class to the PS' analysis of economy and society lends a degree of coherence to its political economy. This association with a class based analysis is subject to criticism from within the party, both on the grounds of being an antiquated relic (from 'Blairites' such as Bockel), and, more cogently, from Poperenistes, the Gauche Socialiste, and Emmanuelli, along the lines set out above. Nevertheless, such a referential provides a framework for advocating the need to redistribute wealth to the poorer members of society. This is couched in terms of both social justice and the need to reconcile the divergent interests of middle classes and couches populaires in the interests of social peace. Paradoxically, although it is today considered one of Europe's more authentic exponents of the political tradition, until the 1990s, the PS shunned the term 'social democracy' 55 , and Jospin still prefers 'Socialist'. 56 However, the PS accepts that it now operates on the ideological territory of social democracy 57 , and the class dimension to its analysis of the economy lends to the PS a recognisably social democratic element to its identity. As we shall see shortly, in terms of electoral strategy, the PS is again a class act.
Section 2: Class and Social Democratic Electoral Strategy since the 'Golden Age'
'Up to the end of the sixties ... the industrial proletariat was numerically the largest component of the electorate, structurally the best organised, morally the most authoritative...
.it was what Italian
theorists termed centralita operaia -the 'centrality of the working class' -that welded together an array of forces of the left. Typically, this is no longer so today.' 58 Przeworski and Sprague's Paper Stones attempts to rigorously demonstrate social democracy's 'electoral dilemma', namely that a 'pure' working class strategy will not succeed, because the working class was deemed to be shrinking. On the other hand, cross-class strategies aimed at courting the middle class involve alienation of some working class support -seen by the authors 55 The term Social democrat accepts the notion of a compromise with capitalism, which, until the 1983 U-turn, the PS firmly rejected, at least rhetorically. 'Social democrat' was used as term of abuse of abuse within the party, for example, by Chevenement to denounce Rocard. and 'an interclassist profile which combined strong support among working-class segments of the population with the ability to attract significant proportions of the middle and even upper segments of salaried employees' as core features. Others saw a blurring of class boundaries brought about by the 'Taylorisation,' in particular of service sector work, bringing about a 'proletarianisation' of white collar workers. 66 Still others identified a decreasing salience of class as a predictor of voting behaviour, for example with a shift from 'closed class to open elections', and 'the decline of class and the rise of issue voting'. 67 Crewe's class dealignment thesis argues that, undermined by amongst other things 'mixed class environments', the causal connection between class and party loyalty had withered away.
These theses have not gone unchallenged. Some argue that, whilst the class structure has become more complex, class has not diminished in its relevance for the individual voter. 68 However, whatever the rights and wrongs of the psephological debate, party elite's perceptions about the nature of the class structure and its impact on voting behaviour were changing. Przeworski argues that 'the relative salience of class as a determinant of voting behaviour is a cumulative consequence of strategies pursued by political parties of the left.' 69 Regardless of the precise nature of 'bottom up' changes in the class structure and its relevance to voting behaviour, the 'top-down' cognitive frameworks of party elites in the two countries accepted (to different degrees) an evolution in the relationship between class and voting. could accurately be characterised as a predominantly class-based party in terms of its 'political communications strategy', today, reference to class is explicitly rejected. As we saw earlier, Blair reformulates Labour's class identity, and celebrates 'a new, larger, more meritocratic middle class'. 75 The party's evolution since 1983 seems to conform in many respects to
New Labour Electoral
Kirchheimer's transformation thesis, 76 Pattie observes that the Labour Party 'has moved from a 'mass' party based in a declining, and decreasingly loyal social group, to something closer to the 'catch-all' party, drawing support broadly.' 77 This is as much a result of 'top-down' party elite strategy as it is of any 'bottom-up' socioeconomic changes in the class structure. As Sartori noted, the salience of factors such as class depends on the willingness of parties to politicise them, since 'the party creates the 'subjective'
class (class consciousness).' 78 The novelty lies in the fact that New Labour has explicitly avoided not only the politicisation, but even the recognition of class, assuming instead that 'the class relations that used to underlie voting and political affiliation have shifted dramatically, owing to the steep decline in the blue-collar working class. On the other hand, Jospin's party, whilst historically less 'organically' tied to class, explicitly recognises the difference between classes -and of need to form a coalition between them. PS's analysis contrasts sharply with 'Blairism' in its more sceptical engagement with neoliberal economics and its explicit recognition of class-based conflicts of interest in society. Yet even the PS mainstream, for all its enduring 'neo-Keynesian' emphasis, has been criticised for not being sufficiently robust in its defence of the couches populaires -for example when it recently introduced tax cuts targeted the whole of society, including high earners.
This is symptomatic of a more general malaise within 21 st Century social democracy. It is grasping for a new political economy -a new guiding set of principles to inform an egalitarian economic strategy. In the post-war era, Keynesian economics and a class-based analysis of society provided both intellectual coherence, economic rationale, and an electoral constituency.
With Keynesianism undermined, and class decreasingly central to social democratic analysis of economy and society, the road ahead is an uncertain one. The PS are much less inclined to cut loose the ties with class, yet even their instinctive propensity to redistribute wealth to the workers is subject to ever tighter constraints. bid to reorient the process of European construction in a more jobs and growth oriented direction was undermined. In the event of welfare retrenchment which could plausibly be blamed on the Growth and Stability Pact, or an economic downturn which could plausibly be blamed on the ECB, the European schism within Jospin's cross-class appeal could re-emerge.
As European integration advances, and with it, potentially, the salience of European issues in deciding domestic British elections, similar caution will be needed by New Labour. Although
New Labour no longer recognises the fact, both parties rely on successfully stitching together an electoral coalition combining working and middle class voters. Thus the electoral fortunes of both the PS and New Labour will continue to be crucially affected by the enduring class cleavage in the years ahead. Furthermore, the class-based electoral cleavage over European integration, which attests both to the increased salience of 'issue voting', and to the enduring relevance of class voting, threatens to further alienate eurosceptic working class voters from pro European social democratic parties, fragmenting their cross class electoral coalitions. This could present electoral socialism in the early 21 st Century with an electoral dilemma akin to that outlined by Przeworksi and Sprague's analysis of 20 th Century socialism.
